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The relationship between intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and
foreign direct investment (FDI) continues to pose a challenging puzzle. While
several studies have found that these two variables are positively correlated,
others have not been able to find conclusive results or have found that the re-
lationship is actually negative. We contend that a partial explanation of these
contradictory results resides on institutional differences among host countries.
We find that increases in IPR protection encourage FDI in countries in which
the shadow (informal) economy represents a relatively small percentage of the
country’s economy but it does not produce the same result in countries in which
that percentage is relatively large. The size of the shadow economy is deter-
mined, in turn, by the quality of institutional variables such as the degree of
bureaucracy, the level of corruption, and the extent of confiscatory taxation and
political instability. We present empirical evidence supporting the results of our
theoretical framework using threshold regression techniques on a sample of 94
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1. Introduction
The relationship between intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and
foreign direct investment (FDI) continues to pose a challenging puzzle. While
several studies have found that there is a positive correlation between these
two variables (e.g. Park and Ginarte (1997) and Branstetter and Saggi (2011)),
others have not been able to find conclusive results (e.g. Braga and Fink (1999)
and Javorcik (2004)) or have found that the relationship is actually negative
(e.g. Glass and Saggi (2002), Rose-Ackerman and Tobin (2005) and Winchell
(2007)).
The aforementioned results are not surprising when one considers that the
relationship between IPR and FDI operates through multiple channels and is
subject to regional and industry effects. Using data from transition economies,
for example, Javorcik (2004) finds that weak IPR protection deters FDI in
technology-intensive sectors but encourages FDI in distribution activities. Maskus
(1998), in turn, finds that IPR protection encourages FDI when is accompanied
by broader business-friendly policies which characterize developed countries but
not their developing counterparts. Moreover, in a very influential article, Glass
and Saggi (2002) argue that IPR protection may generate “resource wasting
and imitation disincentive effects” that reduce both FDI inflows in developing
countries and innovation in developed countries.
Conflicting arguments are also observed at the forefront of international
trade negotiations. Developed countries and multilateral trade organizations
continue to demand that developing countries adopt and enforce stricter IPR
reforms. The latter typically negotiate for softer reforms and longer time hori-
zons as they recognize that FDI depends on several other variables and the
political economy of IPR reforms is complex and difficult to navigate.
Our aim in this paper is to contribute to this discussion from an institutional
economics perspective. As in Glass and Saggi (2002), we argue that the effect
of IPR protection on FDI is largely determined by the competition for domestic
resources between multinational companies (MNCs) and illegal imitation activ-
ity. We depart from Glass and Saggi (2002), however, in that we propose that
such competition is significantly determined by the size of the shadow (informal)
economy where most illegal imitation activity takes place.1
Our argument is as follows. Carrying productive activities in the formal
economy can be very costly when the institutional environment is inefficient (i.e.
characterized by high levels of bureaucracy, corruption, confiscatory taxation,
political instability, etc.). In this type of institutional environment firms and
workers have incentives to replace their formal economic activities for informal
economic activities including illegal imitation. As a result, the relative size of
1In the model proposed by Glass and Saggi (2002), the competition for resources between
MNCs and illegal copiers is determined by technological restrictions. These authors argue that
the production of imitation copies is subject to fixed input ratios. Therefore, as IPR protection
increases, more resources (and not less) are devoted to imitation activity. Consequently, the
availability of domestic resources for MNCs decreases and FDI is discouraged.
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the shadow economy tends to be relatively large. Olsen (2005), for example,
report that illegal copies of pharmaceuticals, motion pictures, records, business
and entertainment software in developing countries - where the shadow economy
tends to be relatively large - represent 60%, 56%, 63%, 64%, and 73% of the
respective total number of copies sold in these countries. In this sense, the
relative size of the shadow economy proxies the extent by which the quality of the
institutional environment gives rise to informal/illegal imitation activity. Given
that, as we mentioned above, illegal domestic imitation activity and MNCs
compete for domestic resources, the size of the shadow economy inversely proxies
the relative scarcity of resources available for MNCs in the formal economy. The
latter significantly affects FDI.2
In this framework, IPR protection can be understood as an effort to re-
duce the size of the shadow economy where illegal imitation happens. IPR
protection increases the cost of production for illegal copiers operating in the
shadow economy and reduce their profit rates. Thus, in countries in which the
shadow economy is relatively small (i.e. the institutional environment is rela-
tively efficient) most illegal copiers would find optimal to abandon their informal
imitation activities and return to the formal economy. As a result, the relative
size of the shadow economy would decrease and the pool of resources available
in the formal economy (e.g. the labor force) would increase. MNCs, therefore,
would not only see their illegal competition reduced but also benefit from the in-
creasing availability of resources available to them. FDI would then be strongly
encouraged. The same is not necessarily true, however, in countries in which
the shadow economy is relatively large (i.e. the institutional environment is rel-
atively inefficient). In this case, excessive bureaucracy, corruption, confiscatory
taxation and/or political instability impose a high barrier between the formal
and shadow economies that illegal copiers may find difficult to overcome. While
an increase in IPR protection reduces their profit rates, illegal copiers may con-
tinue to find optimal to remain operating in the shadow economy. As a result,
both the reduction in illegal competition and the increase in the availability of
resources for MNCs will tend to be smaller or null.
The empirical validation of this hypothesis will crucially depend on the def-
inition of relatively small and relatively large shadow economies. Is there a
cut-off point in the shadow economy distribution at which the relationship be-
tween IPR and FDI changes? A possible approach to this question consists on
using the threshold regression methodology developed by Hansen (1999, 2000).
This methodology allows for the identification of a threshold point in a vari-
able’s distribution at which the relationship between two other variables suffers
a structural break. The obvious advantage of this methodology is that it lets
the sample data determine the location of the cut-off point or threshold rather
2The correlation between the size of the shadow economy (Schneider et al. (2010)) and the
Economic Freedom of the World Summary Index (Gwartney et al. (2007)) for the countries
and years relevant for our study (2000-2005) is in the order of -72%.
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than requiring the researcher to impose it arbitrarily.3 We perform this analysis
on a sample of 94 countries with data for the 2000 - 2005 period. In our baseline
regression model, we find that a statistically significant threshold exists, indeed,
at a value of 30.7% in the shadow economy size distribution (which ranges from
8.5% to 67.7%).4
Several studies have analyzed the effects of institutional variables on FDI.
Wheeler and Mody (1992), Globerman and Shapiro (2002), Aizenman and
Spiegel (2002) and Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2005) have studied the relationship
of FDI with several indices of institutional quality including easiness to create a
company, transparency, tax system, corruption, contract law, security of prop-
erty rights, efficiency of justice and political risk. Some others have focused on
specific determinants (e.g. Wei (1997) and Habib and Zurawicki (2002) have
studied the effects of corruption) or specific regions (e.g. Kinoshita and Cam-
pos (2003) have studied the relationship between FDI and institutional variables
in transition economies and Me´on and Sekkat (2004) have done the same for
MENA countries). As expected, most authors find that more efficient institu-
tional environments tend to attract more FDI. We contribute to this literature
by illustrating a particular channel through which the quality of the institutional
environment affects FDI. We show that the institutional environment conditions
the relationship between IPR protection and FDI by determining the relative
size of the shadow economy where illegal copies are produced.
The next section presents a theoretical framework that illustrates the com-
petition for resources between MNCs and illegal copiers. Section three presents
the empirical strategy and results and section four concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
Assume a market of a given product being served by two types of firms:
MNCs and illegal copiers.5 MNCs establish themselves in the formal economy
and produce original copies of the product. Illegal copiers establish themselves
in the shadow economy and produce illegal imitations of the original copies
produced by MNCs. Original copies and imitation copies are deemed quality-
adjusted substitutes (if imitation copies are only half as good as original copies
then two units of the former are equivalent to one unit of the latter).
We assume that MNCs are monopolistically competitive firms subject to a
constant marginal cost c(r), where r represents the relative abundance of re-
sources (e.g. labor) in the formal economy. An increase in r shifts the marginal
cost for MNCs downwards. As we will see below, r increases when illegal copiers
3Falvey et al. (2006) use threshold regression analysis to study the effects of IPR protection
on economic growth.
4As we explain below in more detail, these figures represent the size of the shadow economy
as a percentage of GDP.
5This framework is based on the model of copyright protection developed by Landes and
Posner (2003).
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abandon the shadow economy and switch to the formal economy as IPR pro-
tection increases.
We assume that illegal copiers operate in a perfectly competitive market
subject to a constant marginal cost m(z), where z is an effective measure of
IPR protection (i.e. it captures the degree of enforcement). An increase in z
shifts the marginal cost for illegal copiers upwards. Economic profits for illegal
copier j can be written as:
Πj = [p−mj(z)]yj −O(w) = 0 (1)
where p is the price of a quality-adjusted imitation copy and O(w) represents
the opportunity cost faced by illegal copiers. This last variable is crucial for the
model. The opportunity cost faced by illegal copiers is given by the utility or
profits that illegal copiers could be earning in the formal economy. As argued
in the previous section, O(w) is a negative function of the size of the shadow
economy (captured by w) or, which is the same, a positive function of the quality
of the institutional environment.
It is then straightforward to illustrate the effects of an increase in IPR pro-
tection. Consider a developed country, D, characterized by a relatively small
shadow economy (i.e. an efficient institutional environment), and a develop-
ing country, U , characterized by a relatively large shadow economy (i.e. an
inefficient institutional environment). To simplify the analysis, assume that
wD < wU ⇒ O(wD) > 0 and O(wU ) < 0. Starting from long run equilibrium,
introduce now a shock whereby both countries experience an increase in IPR
protection (z goes up). As a result, accounting profits for illegal copiers in both
countries, [p−mj(z)]yj , turn negative. Illegal copiers in both countries will then
have incentives to quit their illegal imitation activities and move to the formal
economy. Given, however, that O(wD) > 0 and O(wU ) < 0, a larger number of
illegal copiers will be expected to exit the shadow economy in country D than
in country U . Hence, the pool of resources in the formal economy will increase
to a larger extent in country D than in country U . This will lower the marginal
cost faced by MNCs in country D to a larger extent than in country U . In fact,
if the institutional environment is highly deteriorated in country U (O(wU ) is
large in absolute value), the effect on marginal cost for MNCs in country U may
be insignificant or null.
In summary, through less illegal competition and an increase in the resources
available in the formal economy, an increase in IPR protection will increase
profits for MNCs in country D to a larger extent than in country U . Higher
profits for MNCs, in turn, will encourage higher FDI. First, as existing MNCs
turn more profitable, they will be more likely to increase their investments.
Second, given that MNCs operate in monopolistic competition, an increase in
profits starting from long run equilibrium implies that new MNCs will enter the
market.6
6The derivation of profits for MNCs and the analysis of changes in those profits as IPR
protection increases is presented in Appendix A.
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3. Empirical Strategy
The results of our theoretical framework suggest that IPR protection posi-
tively affects FDI in countries characterized by relatively small shadow economies
to a larger extent than in countries characterized by relatively large shadow
economies. In fact, in the latter case, the effect of IPR protection on FDI may
be null.
In order to empirically investigate the aforementioned results we employ a
specification that includes control variables standard in empirical FDI studies.
Our sample includes an unbalanced panel of 94 countries and data for the years
2000 to 2005. As we explain below, the period of study is largely determined by
the availability of data on IPR protection and the size of the shadow economy.
3.1. Data
3.1.1. FDI
To evaluate the robustness and the heterogeneity of the effect across sec-
tors we employ two different definitions of FDI. Our baseline model uses FDI
net inflows as share of GDP obtained from the World Development Indicators
(WDI). Alternatively, we use U.S. outward FDI net inflows (share of host coun-
try’s GDP) by industry (food, chemicals, metals, machinery, computers and
services) obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. These industries are
selected to maximize data availability for the period of study.
3.1.2. IPR Protection
Our measure of IPR protection is the IPR Protection Index (IPR PI) ob-
tained from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 2007 Annual Report
(Gwartney et al. (2007)). The IPR PI is measured on a 0 to 10 scale with
10 representing the strongest level of IPR protection. The IPR PI is available
annually for the 2000 - 2005 period. Unfortunately, this index was discontinued
with the release of the EFW 2008 Annual Report.
An alternative index of IPR protection commonly used is the Index of Patent
Rights developed by Park and Ginarte (1997). Unfortunately, for the last
decade, this index includes data only for the years 2000 and 2005. While this
index includes data every five years from 1960 to 1995, such data does not co-
incide with our data on the informal economy and so we are unable to use this
source.
3.1.3. Shadow Economy
Schneider et al. (2010) provides data on the size of the shadow economy as
a percentage of GDP for 162 countries from 1999 to 2007. The characterization
of the shadow economy used by Schneider et al. (2010) fits our institutional
argument well. In fact, according to Schneider et al. (2010), some of the reasons
for which a company would operate in the shadow economy include “avoiding
having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages,
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc.,” and “avoiding complying with
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max Corr to FDI
FDI (% GDP) 3.757 4.709 0.024 41.941 1
IPR PI 5.205 2.159 0.9 9.6 0.170
Shadow Economy 30.604 13.909 8.5 67.7 -0.097
GDPpc 8.618 1.537 5.341 11.285 0.161
Population 16.495 1.634 12.547 20.988 -0.299
Openness 86.339 57.468 20.258 422.331 0.558
GCF 22.825 6.424 5.467 84.338 0.348
Inflation 5.342 6.948 -5.355 54.915 -0.148
certain administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires
or other administrative forms.”
Consolidating our data on FDI, IPR protection and the shadow economy,
our period of study is restricted to six years: 2000 to 2005.
3.1.4. Control Variables
The control variables we use are standard in empirical FDI studies (see, for
example, Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2005), Vijayakumar et al. (2010) and Blonigen
and Piger (2011)).
We control for GDP per capita (GDPpc) (in logarithms and measured in
constant 2005 dollars (source: WDI)), Population (in logarithms (source: The
World Bank)), Openness (imports plus exports divided by GDP (source: The
World Bank)), Gross Capital Formation (GCF) (share of GDP (source: WDI)),
and Inflation (GDP deflator (source: WDI)).
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis
as well as their correlation with the dependent variable. Notice that the average
level of FDI is approximately 3.8% with a minimum of 0.024% (Greece) and a
maximum of 41.9% (Hong Kong). The average level of the IPR PI is 5.2 with
a minimum of 0.9 (Haiti) and a maximum of 9.6 (Germany). As far as the
shadow economy, the average level is approximately 31% with a minimum of
8.5% (Switzerland and the U.S.) and a maximum of 67.7% (Bolivia).
Notice as well that, for the entire sample, IPR PI is positively correlated
with FDI while the size of the shadow economy is negatively correlated with
the same variable. The control variables also present correlations with FDI that
are consistent with the results of previous literature.
3.2. Methodology
As mentioned in the Introduction, we use the threshold regression methodol-
ogy developed by Hansen (1999, 2000) to identify cut-off points or thresholds in
the size of the shadow economy distribution at which the relationship between
IPR PI and FDI suffers a structural break.
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This methodology uses a sample-splitting framework that allows endogenous
identification and testing of changes in the slope when the threshold is not known
a priori. The estimated threshold, provided it exists, is then interacted with the
variable of interest and tested in a regression. Thus, our baseline threshold
regression takes the following form:
FDIit = βjXjit+α1IPRitI(ShEit ≤ λˆ) +α2IPRitI(ShEit > λˆ) +µi+νt+ it
(2)
where FDIit is captured by FDI net inflows (% GDP) in country i and period t;
Xjit is a vector of control variables that include GDPpc, Population, Openness,
GCF and Inflation; IPRit is IPR PI in country i and period t; ShEit is Schneider
et al.’s (2010) measure of the size of the shadow economy in country i and period
t; µi and vt are country and time specific fixed effects; and it is a well-behaved
idiosyncratic error. Also, λˆ is the threshold/cut-off point in the ShE distribution.
The methodology divides the observations into two regimes depending on
whether ShE is smaller or larger than λˆ. Thus, the effect of IPR on FDI will
be given by α1 for countries in the low shadow economy regime and by α2 for
countries in the high shadow economy regime.
A grid search is used to determine the value of the threshold that minimizes
the sum of squared errors of the model. More formally, we define the residual
sum of squares of the model estimated for a threshold level as S(λˆ) = u(λˆ)′u(λˆ).
Then the optimal threshold is given by λˆ = arg minS(λˆ). The grid search uses
all the values within the 20th and 80th percentiles of the empirical distribution of
the size of the shadow economy to guarantee a minimum number of observations
in the sample falling above and below the threshold.
Having identified a potential threshold, it is important to determine whether
the threshold effect is statistically significant. To this aim we test the hypothesis
of no threshold effects, Ho: α1 = α2. Given that the threshold value does not
present a standard distribution, we follow Hansen (2000) and use a likelihood
ratio statistic to test for the null hypothesis. The LR-statistic is defined as
LR0 = (S0−S1(λˆ))/σ2 with σ2 = S1(λˆ)/n(t−1). Where S0 denotes the residual
sum of squares for the model without a threshold and σ2 is the estimated error
variance in the presence of the threshold. The estimated value is compared to
the critical values reported in Hansen (1999). The critical value is based on the
asymptotic distribution of the LR-statistic which can be written as Pr(ζ ≤ x) =
(1− exp(−x/2))2. The inverse of this formula can be used to obtain the critical
values based on c(α) = −2 log(1− d(1− α)).
3.3. Results
Table 2 presents the results of our baseline regression model using FDI net
inflows (% GDP) as the dependent variable. For an initial comparison, col-
umn 1 presents a parsimonious linear regression with no threshold effects. In
this specification, IPR PI is positive and significantly correlated to FDI for the
entire sample. As mentioned before, this result is consistent with several empir-
ical studies performed in the past. Additionally, two control variables present
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a significant relationship with FDI: Population and GCF. In the latter case,
the relationship is positive indicating that the internal formation of capital is
complementary to FDI. This result has also been found in previous studies (see,
for example, Krkoska (2001)). In the former case the relationship is negative
indicating that countries with larger population levels attract less FDI. Given
that our measure of FDI is the share of FDI on GDP, this results may be captur-
ing the fact that countries with larger populations tend to present larger GDP
levels. In fact, this last result disappears when we use U.S. outward FDI by
industry as the dependent variable (see Table 3). Notice as well that the coeffi-
cient for the shadow economy, while negative, is not significantly correlated to
FDI. Thus, in this specification, the size of the informal economy does not seem
to have a direct effect on FDI.
Column 2 presents the results of the specification of interest as presented
in equation (2). The application of the threshold methodology allows us to
find a threshold value (λˆ) at 30.7% in the shadow economy size distribution at
which the relationship between IPR PI and FDI suffers a structural break. The
threshold value found is significantly different from 0 at the 0.01 significance
level. The threshold level splits the sample in two groups with almost the same
number of countries in each. As an example, countries like the U.S., Germany,
Australia and Norway fall below the threshold while countries such as Algeria,
Bolivia, Egypt and Nigeria fall above it.7
Our results are consistent with the theoretical intuition developed above. We
find that IPR PI is negative and not significantly correlated to FDI for countries
with relatively large shadow economies. On the other hand, IPR PI is positive
and significantly correlated to FDI for countries with relatively small shadow
economies. In fact, in this last case, the coefficient estimate shows that the
relationship between IPR PI and FDI is almost twice as large as the one found
in column 1. Thus, for countries presenting relatively small shadow economies,
a one point increase in IPR is associated with an increase of 0.64 percentage
points in FDI. This effect is sizable as it represents a relative increase of 17%
with respect to the average level of FDI of 3.76%. The results in terms of the
control variables and the size of the shadow economy are qualitatively similar
to those found in column 1. This suggests that, as predicted by the theoretical
framework, the size of the shadow economy has an indirect effect on FDI though
the determination of the relationship between IPR and FDI.
For an illustration of the results consider Figure 1 which plots the combina-
tions of IPR PI and FDI for each country and period in the sample. Consistent
with the results in column 1 of Table 2, and apart for a few outlying observa-
tions at the lower end of the IPR distribution, the figure suggests that IPR PI
and FDI are, indeed, positively correlated. Perhaps the most striking aspect of
7The regression in column 2 does not control for fixed effects as a join test rejected the
significance of those dummies indicating a “quiet” time span for the analysis.
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Table 2: Regression Results
Dependent variable FDI (% GDP)
(1) (2)
IPR PI 0.3720**
(0.1752)
IPR PI (ShE >= λˆ) -0.0239
(0.2142)
IPR PI (ShE < λˆ) 0.6428**
(0.2619)
Shadow Economy -0.1604 -0.3719
(0.3102) (0.3096)
GDPpc 4.8020 2.9853
(3.5008) (3.0469)
Population -14.0248* -13.8632*
(7.3926) (7.0367)
Openness 0.0215 0.0194
(0.0218) (0.0217)
GCF 0.2687*** 0.2766***
(0.0532) (0.0512)
Inflation 0.0178 0.0260
(0.0158) (0.0177)
Constant 188.5982 207.8339
(127.9230) (126.0457)
λˆ 30.7%
LR-statistic 13.142***
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.159
Observations 482 482
Standard errors in parenthesis
Statistical significance: *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
All regressions include country fixed effects
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Figure 1: IPR PI vs. FDI
the graph, however, is its triangular property: FDI can take low and medium
values at lower levels of IPR PI but it can take low, medium and high values at
higher levels of IPR PI. In this sense, higher IPR PI levels command a higher
likelihood of attracting higher FDI values but do not constitute a sufficient
condition. This observation goes to the heart of our argument: the relation-
ship between IPR protection and FDI depends on exogenous conditions. We
claim that such exogenous conditions are partially given by the quality of the
institutional environment.
To better visualize this idea, the sample is split by coloring with light gray
the observations (countries/period) that present shadow economy sizes above
the threshold of 30.7% and with dark grey the observations (countries/period)
that fall below it. The relationship between IPR PI and FDI in the second group
is more clearly positive than in the entire sample. It is, however, very difficult
to identify any relationship between those two variables in the first group.
Table 3 presents the results when using U.S. outward FDI net inflows (share
of host country’s GDP) by industry as the dependent variable. The results
are mixed but in most cases consistent with the theoretical intuition. We find
thresholds levels ranging from 16% to 26.1% in the size of the shadow economy
distribution. The regression using U.S. outward FDI in food, metals and services
present results very similar to those in column 2 in Table 2. That is, the
coefficient of IPR PI is positive and significantly different from zero for countries
presenting relatively small shadow economies but not for countries presenting
relatively large shadow economies. In fact, for the case of services, the coefficient
of IPR for countries presenting large shadow economies is not only negative
but also significantly different from zero implying that increases in IPR PI are
actually associated with lower levels of U.S. outward FDI. On the other hand,
we do not find coefficients significantly different from zero above or below the
11
Table 3: Regression Results - Dependent Variable: U.S. Outward FDI by Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
food chemicals metals machinery computers services
IPR PI (ShE>= λˆ) -0.009 -0.026 -0.000 0.000 -0.083 -0.024*
(0.009) (0.031) (0.003) (0.005) (0.056) (0.013)
IPR PI (ShE< λˆ) 0.024** -0.095 0.008* 0.018 0.076 0.030*
(0.010) (0.090) (0.004) (0.011) (0.101) (0.015)
Shadow Economy 0.016 0.032 -0.011 0.006 -0.248 0.018
(0.016) (0.037) (0.008) (0.012) (0.172) (0.026)
GDPpc 0.057 -0.119 -0.007 0.056 -2.715 0.530*
(0.115) (0.860) (0.084) (0.084) (1.825) (0.296)
Population -0.076 2.038 -0.234 0.207 0.188 -0.024
(0.503) (1.220) (0.210) (0.249) (2.602) (0.723)
Openness -0.001 0.003 -0.001** 0.000 -0.021 0.002
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001)
GCF -0.000 -0.024* 0.002 -0.002 0.068* -0.018**
(0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.039) (0.008)
Inflation -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.015 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001)
Constant 0.419 -33.509* 4.407 -4.116 29.417 -4.665
(8.115) (17.674) (3.794) (4.541) (48.880) (12.197)
λˆ 26.1 16 25.79 18.6 16.6 26.1
LR-statistic 11.543*** 22.093*** 2.602 30.613*** 9.470** 15.174***
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.124 0.074 0.138 0.248 0.210
Observations 237 248 214 241 235 257
Standard errors in parenthesis
Statistical significance: *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
All regressions include country fixed effects
threshold for chemicals, machinery and computers.
Further robustness tests to our baseline specification are performed in Table
B1 in Appendix B. The results are robust and stable to the inclusion of a year
lag for GDPpc, Inflation and Population. We perform this test as it could be
argued that there are potential endogenous effects of these variables with FDI.
Finally, we also test the presence of a threshold using the percentage change in
FDI as the dependent variable instead of its level. In all cases, the results are
qualitatively similar to those in column 2 of Table 2.
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4. Conclusion
The relationship between IPR protection and FDI continues to pose a chal-
lenging puzzle at both the academic and public policy forefronts. We contribute
to this discussion from an institutional economics perspective.
Our argument is as follows. Carrying productive activities in the formal
economy can be very costly when the institutional environment is inefficient (i.e.
characterized by high levels of bureaucracy, corruption, confiscatory taxation,
political instability, etc.). In this type of institutional environments firms and
workers have incentives to replace their formal economic activities for informal
economic activities including illegal imitation. As a result, the relative size of
the shadow economy tends to be relatively large. Given that illegal domestic
imitation activity and MNCs compete for local resources, the size of the shadow
economy inversely proxies the relative scarcity of resources available for MNCs
in the formal economy. The latter significantly affects FDI.
In this framework, IPR protection can be understood as an effort to re-
duce the size of the shadow economy where illegal imitation happens. IPR
protection increases the cost of production for illegal copiers operating in the
shadow economy and reduce their profit rates. Thus, in countries in which the
shadow economy is relatively small (i.e. the institutional environment is rela-
tively efficient) most illegal copiers would find optimal to abandon their informal
imitation activities and return to the formal economy. As a result, the relative
size of the shadow economy would decrease and the pool of resources available
in the formal economy (e.g. the labor force) would increase. MNCs, therefore,
would not only see their illegal competition reduced but also benefit from the in-
creasing availability of resources. FDI would be strongly encouraged. The same
is not necessarily true, however, in countries in which the shadow economy is
relatively large (i.e. the institutional environment is relatively inefficient). In
this case, excessive bureaucracy, corruption, confiscatory taxation and/or polit-
ical instability impose a high barrier between the formal and shadow economies
that illegal copiers may find difficult to overcome. While an increase in IPR pro-
tection reduces their profit rates, illegal copiers may continue to find optimal
to remain operating in the shadow economy. As a result, both the reduction
in illegal competition and the increase in the availability of resources for MNCs
will tend to be smaller or null.
Using threshold regression analysis, we find a significant threshold or cut-
off point at a level of 30.7% in the shadow economy size distribution at which
the relationship between IPR protection and FDI suffers a structural break.
Consistent with the theoretical intuition, the results show that IPR protection
is negative and not significantly correlated to FDI (as a percentage of GDP)
for countries with relatively large shadow economies. On the other hand, IPR
protection is positive and significantly correlated to FDI for countries with rela-
tively small shadow economies. In fact, in this last case, the coefficient estimate
shows that the relationship between IPR protection and FDI is almost twice as
large as the one found in a simple linear regression with no threshold effects. For
our sample and period of study, in countries presenting relatively small shadow
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economies, a one point increase in IPR protection is associated with an increase
of 0.64 percentage points in FDI. This effect is sizable as it represents a relative
increase of 17% with respect to the average level of FDI of 3.76%.
We further explore the relationship between IPR protection and FDI by us-
ing U.S. outward FDI by industries. The results are mixed but in most cases
consistent with the theoretical intuition. In all cases, we find thresholds levels
significantly different from zero ranging from 16% to 26.1% in the shadow econ-
omy size distribution. The regression using U.S. outward FDI in food, metals
and services present results very similar to those found in our baseline regression.
That is, the coefficient of IPR is positive and significantly different from zero
for countries presenting relatively small shadow economies but not for countries
presenting relatively large shadow economies. In fact, for the case of services,
the coefficient of IPR for countries presenting large shadow economies is not
only negative but also significantly different from zero implying that increases
in IPR protection are actually associated with lower levels of U.S. outward FDI.
On the other hand, we do not find coefficients significantly different from zero
above or below the threshold for chemicals, machinery and computers.
The results are robust and stable to the inclusion of a year lag for GDPpc,
Inflation and Population as well as the use of percentage changes in FDI as the
dependent variable.
References
Aizenman, J. and Spiegel, M. M. (2002), Institutional efficiency, monitoring
costs and the investment share of FDI, Working paper, National Bureau of
Economic Research. No. 9324.
Be´nassy-Que´re´, A., Coupet, M. and Mayer, T. (2005), Institutional Determi-
nants of FDI, Working paper, CEPII. (5).
Blonigen, B. and Piger, J. (2011), Determinants of foreign direct investment,
Working paper, Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
No. 16704.
Braga, C. P. and Fink, C. (1999), ‘How stronger protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights affects international trade flows’, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper (2051).
Branstetter, L. and Saggi, K. (2011), ‘Intellectual property rights, foreign
direct investment and industrial development*’, The Economic Journal
121(555), 1161–1191.
Falvey, R., Foster, N. and Greenaway, D. (2006), ‘Intellectual property rights
and economic growth’, Review of Development Economics 10(4), 700–719.
Glass, J. and Saggi, K. (2002), ‘Intellectual property rights and foreign direct
investment’, Journal of International Economics 56(2), 387–410.
14
Globerman, S. and Shapiro, D. (2002), National political infrastructure and
foreign direct investment, Ottawa: Industry Canada.
Gwartney, J., Lawson, R., with Hall, J., Sobel, R. and Leeson, P. (2007), Eco-
nomic Freedom of the World: 2007 Annual Report, Vancouver, BC: The
Fraser Institute. Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com.
Habib, M. and Zurawicki, L. (2002), ‘Corruption and foreign direct investment’,
Journal of international business studies pp. 291–307.
Hansen, B. E. (1999), ‘Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: Estimation,
testing, and inference’, Journal of econometrics 93(2), 345–368.
Hansen, B. E. (2000), ‘Sample splitting and threshold estimation’, Econometrica
pp. 575–603.
Javorcik, B. S. (2004), ‘Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productiv-
ity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages’,
American Economic Review 94(3), 605–627.
Kinoshita, Y. and Campos, N. F. (2003), ‘Why does FDI go where it goes? New
evidence from the transition economies’.
Krkoska, L. (2001), Foreign Direct Investment Financing of Capital Formation
in Central and Eastern Europe, Working paper, EBRD. No. 67.
Landes, W. and Posner, R. (2003), The economic structure of intellectual prop-
erty law, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Maskus, K. E. (1998), ‘Role of intellectual property rights in encouraging foreign
direct investment and technology transfer’, Duke Journal of Comparative &
International Law 9(1), 109–162.
Me´on, P. G. and Sekkat, K. (2004), ‘Does the quality of institutions limit
the MENA’s integration in the world economy?’, The World Economy
27(9), 1475–1498.
Olsen, K. (2005), Counterfeiting and piracy: Measurement issues, in
‘WIPO/OECD Expert Meeting on Measurement and Statistical Issues’,
Geneva.
Park, W. G. and Ginarte, J. C. (1997), ‘Intellectual property rights and eco-
nomic growth’, Contemporary Economic Policy 15(3), 51–61.
Rose-Ackerman, S. and Tobin, J. (2005), ‘Foreign direct investment and the
business environment in developing countries: The impact of bilateral invest-
ment treaties’, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper (293).
Schneider, F., Buehn, A. and Montenegro, C. E. (2010), ‘New Estimates for
the Shadow Economies all over the World’, International Economic Journal
24(4), 443–461.
15
The World Bank Data Catalogue (n.d.).
URL: http://data.worldbank.org
Vijayakumar, N., Perumal, S. and Rao, K. C. (2010), ‘Determinants of FDI
in BRICS Countries: A panel analysis’, International Journal of Business
Science and Applied Management 5(3), 1–13.
Wei, S. J. (1997), Why is corruption so much more taxing than tax?: Arbitrari-
ness kills, Working paper, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research. No. 6255.
Wheeler, D. and Mody, A. (1992), ‘International investment location decisions:
The case of US firms’, Journal of international economics 33(1), 57–76.
Winchell, J. (2007), Determinants of foreign direct investment in developing
countries: Bilateral investment treaties and intellectual property rights, in
‘annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Con-
vention’.
16
Appendix A: Profits for MNCs
Profits for a representative MNC, i, are given by:
Πi = [p− ci(z)][q(p)− y(p, z)]
where p is the price of a copy (original or quality-adjusted imitation), y the
aggregate supply of illegal imitation copies, and q(p) the total market demand
for copies.8
The price level that maximizes these profits solves:
[q(p)− y(p, z)] + [p− ci(z)]
(
dq
dp
− dy
dp
)
= 0
which can be re-written as:
p
[
1− G|d|+ s(1−G)
]
= c(z)
where G is the fraction of original copies out of total copies produced, d =
qp(p/q) is the price elasticity of demand, and 
s = yp(p/y) is the price elasticity
of total supply by illegal copiers.9
The change in Πi as IPR protection increases is:
dΠi
dz
=
[
dp
dz
− dc
dz
]
[q(p)− y(p, z)] + [p− c(z)]
[
dq
dp
dp
dz
−
(
dy
dp
dp
dz
+
dy
dz
)]
Assuming the first-order profit maximizing condition:
dΠi
dz
= −
[
p− c(z)
]
dy
dz
− dc
dz
[
q(p)− y(p, z)
]
> 0
Thus, the size of dΠi/dz is determined by the absolute values of dy/dz
and dc/dz. In countries with relatively small shadow economies, these two
expressions are bigger than in countries with relatively large shadow economies.
8Obviously, dy/dp > 0, dy/dz < 0, and |dy/dz|ss > |dy/dz|ls, where ss stands for small
shadow economy and ls for large shadow economy.
9The second-order condition is ∂2Π/∂p2 = 2(qp − yp) + (p − c(z))(qpp − ypp), which is
assumed to be less than zero.
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Appendix B: Robustness Tests
Table B1: Regression Results Alternative Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI (%GDP) FDI (%GDP) FDI (%GDP) % Diff FDI
IPR (ShE>= λˆ) -0.0089 0.0177 0.1750 0.0491
(0.2093) (0.2082) (0.2325) (0.0619)
IPR (ShE< λˆ) 0.6630** 0.6916*** 0.7772*** 0.1457**
(0.2527) (0.2511) (0.2591) (0.0611)
Shadow Economy -0.6024** -0.6464** -0.6456* -0.1039
(0.3026) (0.3082) (0.3579) (0.0838)
GDPpc 0.1521
(0.7507)
Population -16.7017** -1.5563
(6.7946) (1.4922)
Openness 0.0266 0.0270 0.0371 0.0072**
(0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0279) (0.0033)
GCF 0.2680*** 0.2637*** 0.0194**
(0.0518) (0.0521) (0.0096)
Inflation 0.0303 0.0327* 0.0263 0.0068
(0.0188) (0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0054)
Lag GDPpc 0.2328 0.0339 1.4844
(2.9166) (2.9251) (2.6132)
Lag Population -19.5168*** -24.8837***
(6.8937) (8.3443)
Lag GCF -0.0048
(0.0684)
Constant 285.1628** 334.3871*** 415.1369*** 26.0732
(120.0978) (124.0927) (146.9159) (26.4472)
λˆ 30.7 30.7 30.7 27.6
LR-statistic 13.619*** 13.783*** 10.249** 8.295**
Adjusted R2 0.162 0.167 0.099 0.032
Observations 471 471 470 468
Standard errors in parenthesis
Statistical significance: *p <0.1, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
All regressions include country fixed effects
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